This article describes Chinese peacebuilding efforts in Liberia and presents views expressed by Monrovians as assessment of projections of Chinese soft-power in post-conflict Liberia. Monrovians are overwhelmingly positive towards China, which is represented by Chinese construction companies who have been the mainstay of infrastructure rehabilitation in this small, West African state recovering 7 Steven C. Y. Kuo "Chinese Peacebuilding in Liberia as soft-power projection: perspectives from Monrovia " from civil war. As a part of the Chinese practice of peacebuilding and central to its soft-power projection in Africa, we can tentatively regard the strategy of infrastructure-led aid and peacebuilding to have achieved its objectives.
Introduction
Beijing conducts its foreign policy, provides aid and participates in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) in order to promote its national interests. For Beijing, China's African policy has primarily been driven by the need to win diplomatic recognition and legitimacy against competitors, whether it was the Soviet Union, the United States or Taiwan (Brautigam, 2009:34) . While Africa has never been nor will it ever become a top priority for China's economic, foreign or security interests, it has always served an important instrumental role -as allies providing political support-against US and Soviet competition (Kuo, 2012) .
In competition with the Soviet Union, Beijing's African policy from the 1950's to the 1970s was to support liberation movements that were in competition with movements supported by the Soviet Union. In this regard, China supported liberation movements such as Mugabe's Zimbabwe African Nations Union, Algeria's National Liberation Front and Edurado Mondlane's Mozambique Liberation Front (Shinn, 2008; Taylor, 1998 Taylor, , 2000 . When Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, he made the decision to change China's strategy from challenging the world order and promoting world revolution to focus on domestic economic growth. According to realist international relations terminology, China changed its posture from a revisionist to a status quo power. Driven by a desire to increase its comprehensive national strength and focusing on economic development, Beijing begun to emphasize the principle of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. The promotion of the principle of non-interference served to promote a peaceful international environment whereby it can continue to grow economically.
At the onset of the second decade of the twenty-first century, both China's circumstance and the international environment have changed. China has evolved from an underdeveloped, isolationist and belligerent Maoist state to become the second largest economy impatient for political influence and status commensurate to its economic bulk and historical greatness (see Deng, 2008) . As China transitions from a third world country to a great power, a great deal of policy shifts and adjustments from China is being made. This is in response to both in its own grand strategic reassessment as well as in response to the growing expectations of the international community. Foremost and the most visible shift in Chinese collective security policy is in her increasing participation in UNPKOs in Africa. With the West turning its attention towards former Soviet states and the terrorist threat post-9/11, African countries have increasingly turned to China to play a greater role as peace-maker (Sudan and South Sudan), peacekeeper and peace-builder.
A good deal of research has been published describing and analysing Beijing's evolving position on UNPKOs from one of distrust prior to the 1980s to one of reluctant acceptance in the 1990s to a fully participating member in the 2000s (Taylor-Fravel, 1996; Tzou, 1998; Gill and Reilly, 2000; Stahle, 2008; He 2007; Wu and Taylor, 2011; Zhao, 2011; Kuo, 2012; Aubyn, 2013) . We now understand that the evolving Chinese attitude towards UNPKOs from the 1980s to the 2010s reflects China's evolving role from an aggrieved outsider to an accepted member of the international community. However, China is not simply being socialised into the western liberal OECD norms in aid, it has always followed its own practice of aid (Brautigam, 2009) . In fact, alternative practices in aid and peacebuilding by BRICS countries have already begun challenge liberal OECD models of aid and peacebuilding (Chin and Quadir, 2013; Richmond and Tellidis, 2013) .
Beijing has recognised the central importance of "soft-power" projection. At the Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007, the Communist Party of China recognised China's cultural soft-power (GuojiaWenhuaRuanShili; 国家文化软实力) as an important part of its comprehensive national strength (ZhongheGuoli; 综合国力) and an indicator of its international competitiveness. Subsequent to this, Wei of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China argues that foreign aid in Africa in particular can be a part of Chinese soft-power projection. She provides three reasons for this. First, it was useful in constructing a Chinese image as a peaceful, co-operative, win-win focused and responsible power. Second, it was useful in helping Africa and the world to understand China, Chinese policies and Chinese activities in Africa. Third, it would stimulate competition in aid to Africa with the resulting benefit for African development (Wei, 2011: 32-22) .
In addition to literature in English and Chinese accounting for why China participates in aid and UNPKOs in Africa; case study based comparative research has begun to appear examining Chinese aid projects in Rwanda (Grimm et al, 2010) , DR Congo (Pollet et al, 2011) and Ethiopia (Hackenesch, 2013) . In addition, multi-country surveys of civil society attitudes towards China and Chinese presence in Africa has appeared (Vaes and Huyse, 2013) . However, little is known about how China participates in comprehensive peacebuilding and even less is known about how locals in post-conflict contexts in Africa perceive Chinese contributions. In other words, given China is interested in projecting soft-power and presenting a peaceful rising image of itself in Africa, how effective has this been? Is the Chinese approach to peacebuilding an alternative to the liberal peace? Is China, so to speak, "winning hearts and minds" of the locals in a post-conflict setting? In the case of its bilateral projects, Beijing overcomes inefficiencies and the potential for local corruption by not handing any money to African governments directly. Projects are decided with the relevant African government, and then all the project management -from tendering, the sourcing of materials and general management -is handled from Beijing through the Chinese embassy 4 . The construction of the new Fendall campus of the University of Liberia and the Tappita Hospital by the Guangdong Foreign Construction Co.; the refurbishment of the SKD Sports Complex in Monrovia; and the construction and supply of medical equipment to the Tappita Hospital are examples of Chinese bi-lateral aid in Liberia (Embassy of PRC in Liberia, 2007). While evidently quicker in providing results on the ground and employing far fewer personnel compared to the Western aid industry, this model of aid does however suffer from the problem of a lack of skills transfer in terms of both labour and management skills. It also does not employ local sub-contractors and therefore limits the social-economic impact and creation of jobs that large infrastructural projects usually provide. It was noted that communication between the site foreman and local workers could be a problem with the Chinese model of operation in infrastructure projects.
Sino-Liberian relations and the Chinese participation in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
A local Liberian engineering consultant at the Ministry of Public Works confirmed that the language barrier is an impediment to working with the Chinese and that a lack of capacity building and skills transfer from Chinese firms was a problem 5 . However, on the issue of the widespread perception that Chinese firms carry out poor quality work in Africa (and in Monrovia, some of the main roads were in a very poor state during our visit), the engineer pointed out that the emergency road rehabilitation work in Monrovia was commissioned on a lower load specification and without drainage because of the limited funding provided by the World Bank. It was in fact the limited funding provided that led to lower specifications for roads and their quick deterioration, and not sub-standard Chinese workmanship.
In addition to aid, the most significant Chinese contribution to Liberia to date is the US$ 2.8 billion deal that China Union signed with Liberian government in 2009, making this deal the single largest investment in Liberian history (Creamer, 2009) .
Chinese presence in post-conflict Liberia: Liberian perspectives
In a context where Liberians generally express dissatisfaction at the failure of UN-MIL and associated UN agencies to deliver tangible material improvements after establishing a fragile peace, the visible presence of Chinese construction is widely appreciated. But many interviewees in Monrovia said that they thought the Chinese engagement in Liberia was not benevolent. They felt that the Chinese are acting in self-interest and that, given Liberia's weak state and the history of colonialism in Africa, the balance of the benefit of Chinese engagement will probably go to the Chinese. However, despite this commonly expressed sentiment, most Liberians express appreciation of the positive impact of Chinese-built infrastructure are having on meeting everyday needs of post-war Monrovians.
Liberian interviewees tend to contrast the newly arrived Chinese with Westerners. A local journalist provided a vivid contrast and said that: The observation that Chinese presence in post-war Liberia is focused on infrastructure and not on "capacity building" (as the West does) was an obvious and common observation by many interviewees. Both the Liberian government and civil society see their relationship with China as based on economic gain. A Liberian official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that Africa needs foreign direct investment and China needs resources, in this way the two are a good match for one another. Given the infrastructure deficit in Liberia, China is filling a gap that is not filled by Western donors. Contrasting Western and Chinese engagement, this foreign affairs official points out that conditionalities imposed by the West directly translates to not enough infrastructure beingbuilt. Voicing a common complaint in Africa, he said that international NGOs do not "pay regard to local reality" and that "we need to satisfy international whims". 8 It is in contrast to the dissatisfaction with the West-led liberal peace that many interviewees express the opinion that the Chinese are more respectful of local conditions, do not dictate terms like the West and are directly making a difference to lives of ordinary people.
The perceptions of the Chinese approach to peacebuilding by international NGOs, international financial institutions and western governmental aid organisations are mixed. An official at an international financial institution, with reference to its own good governance and capacity building programmes, pointed out that the Chinese model of management from Beijing was not building capacity in the Liberian government and therefore was unsustainable 9 . Managers at a Western government aid agency pointed out that the Chinese do not get involved with other international (western) donors 10 . Another official at a Western government aid agency however conceded that it was noticing how much infrastructure was appreciated by everyday Liberians and was learning lessons from the Chinese model 11 .
Understanding Beijing's approach to peace building
In her book discussing Chinese aid to Africa, (Brautigam, 2009:11) .
The present examination of the Chinese approach to peacebuilding in Liberia largely confirms Brautigam's description for Chinese aid in Africa generally. China, like other countries, provides aid for three reasons: strategic diplomacy, commercial benefits, and as a reflection of its values (Brautigam, 2009:15) . Through its bilateral aid projects and its multilateral engagements through its engineering, medical and transportation units, Beijing is successfully building a good relationship with the Liberian government; is opening new markets for its construction firms; and showcasing Chinese values of hard-work and respect for other cultures. In terms of China's normative perspective and soft-power projection, China is particularly keen to project its developing world credentials by emphasizing by both word and deed that it is willing to work the more 'dirty jobs' as opposed to office posts in the capital. In this way, Beijing is emphasizing its value difference to the West.
Beijing's infrastructure-led aid and its efficient construction companies are certainly appreciated by Liberians. All things being equal, bridges, roads, hospitals and schools should facilitate economic development.
Conclusion
Over the past three or four years, literature on Chinese developmental assistance in various African countries have blossomed. Based on fieldwork, they have brought refreshing information on Chinese developmental assistance in Africa which in fact has remained far more consistent in its guiding principles and practices compared with western aid. This new body of literature also provides excellent evidence against the charge of neo-colonialism against the Chinese emanating from the west. The emergence of China in Africa in the realm of aid and development has also shone a light on shortcomings of existing OECD aid in Africa. China's focus on infrastructure construction and emphasis on not imposing conditionaltiesis very much appreciated by African governments and people though much derided by the West. While it is not the intention of this article to enter into the aid conditionality debate, China's emergence in development assistance has certainly provided healthy competition to the monopoly the OECD held -both in terms of norms as well as in practice-in the development marketplace. Instead of the ever positive assessments provided in glossy annual reports by the western aid industry itself, we are now better able to see western aid's shortcomings and how China's approach to development, backed by substantial financial muscle, provides a healthy alternative to neoliberal orthodoxy.
Related to development assistance is peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Given the slow but steady increase in Chinese participation in UNPKOs, we are beginning to observe greater Chinese presence in post-conflict Africa. The next step for the Chinese in Africa is to merge peacekeeping and development assistance in the form of a Chinese approach topeacebuilding. As far as China's contribution to Liberia's post-war re-construction is concerned, Chinese construction firms have made a significant difference in bettering the lives of ordinary Liberians and there were unanimous appreciation for this among Liberians interviewed. After the provision of basic security by UNMIL, the provision of basic infrastructure by Chinese construction companies is the most visible and arguably the next most important step in normalising the daily lives of everyday Liberians. In addition to the provision of basic infrastructure by its almost omnipresent construction firms, Chinese enterprises have also injected much needed capital in the form of foreign direct investment in Liberia, the most significant thus far been the
